A Comprehensive Overview of Drone Warfare in Ukraine
By Nathan Balis
May 20, 2025 | Military Technology | Ukraine
The February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered an unprecedented acceleration in military technological innovation, with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, emerging as a defining feature of the conflict. This war has rapidly transformed into a real-world laboratory, showcasing the versatile and increasingly decisive role of drones. UAVs have fundamentally altered battlefield dynamics by acting as indispensable force multipliers alongside conventional weaponry. Their impact is profoundly felt in enhancing artillery precision and in enabling potent suicide missions against critical targets. The relentless cycle of adaptation, modification, and the growing emphasis on expendability has given rise to a new paradigm of tactical drone warfare. This article examines the evolution of drone warfare in Ukraine, from the onset of Russian aggression to discussions of potential ceasefire.
Fixed-Wing Legacy Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance at the Outset of War
At the onset of conflict in Ukraine, the aerial landscape was initially shaped by "legacy" drone systems---large, sophisticated platforms that had previously defined the drone warfare doctrines of major military powers, including the United States. These systems, often comparable in size to small aircraft and costing tens of millions of dollars, were the bedrock of established drone dominance, optimized for counterterrorism operations and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions within uncontested airspace, characteristic of the Global War on Terror. Engineered for endurance, some capable of loitering for over 30 hours, these drones offered persistent surveillance but generally lacked stealth features, a design choice viable against adversaries with limited air defense capabilities. Their operation demanded large crews working in shifts, and they delivered powerful strike capabilities with precision-guided munitions like Hellfires and GBU-12s.
While American platforms such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-1 Predator faced strict export restrictions, other nations successfully developed their own unmanned fixed-wing aircraft. It was these types of systems that initially populated the drone battlespace in Ukraine. Russia deployed its Orlan-10 and Forpost drones to provide sustained ISR, enabling battlefield mapping and enhancing artillery targeting, while Ukrainian forces utilized their domestically produced Leleka-100 and PD-1/2 systems.
Among the most notable early drones was the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2, a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone with substantial precision-guided munitions capability. The TB2 gained significant acclaim in the initial months of the war after Ukrainian forces effectively employed it against Russian air defense systems, supply convoys, and armored vehicles. However, the TB2's prominence was short-lived. Like many legacy drones, its non-stealthy design made it highly vulnerable to sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) prevalent in contested airspace. Consequently, by mid-2022, Russian air defenses had largely neutralized the TB2 threat: its design, optimized for permissive counterinsurgency-style environments, was ill-suited for a high-intensity conflict where air superiority could not be established.
This initial phase of drone warfare was thus characterized by military-grade, fixed-wing ISR platforms. The core utility of these systems lay in achieving battlefield transparency and providing reusable assets for real-time forward observation, artillery fire direction and adjustment, and the cueing of other strike systems. However, the very nature of the Ukrainian battlefield would soon challenge this established legacy paradigm.
The Rise of the Quadcopter: Democratizing Drone Warfare in Early 2022
Within mere months of the conflict's start, the transformative potential of smaller, cheaper commercial quadcopter drones became apparent. Rapid innovation made its way onto the battlefield, notably with the implementation of sophisticated communication links for constellations of low-altitude UAVs. Such networks, where multiple drones operate cooperatively, significantly enhanced information relay and extended the operational range of these line-of-sight limited drones, thereby improving mission coordination for combined ISR and strike roles. These advancements exposed the limitations of legacy drone designs and catalyzed the shift towards smaller low-altitude systems.
These multi-rotor, short-range commercial drones offered what their larger, more expensive predecessors could not: affordability and widespread availability. While legacy systems possessed superior range, endurance, and payload capacities, quadcopters effectively "democratized" drone warfare. They empowered infantry units with immediate, real-time ISR and strike capabilities, bypassing the need for centralized command and approval. Thus, the paradigm shifted from a few high-value, high-cost assets to a multitude of cheaper, expendable tools. This change made drones accessible to smaller units on the very frontlines of the conflict.
Quadcopters also brought distinct technical and mission-specific advantages. Their vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and hovering capabilities facilitated operations in the complex environments of urban warfare and entrenched positions. Their diminutive size, low operational altitude, and reduced radio frequency (RF) signatures made them significantly harder to detect compared to larger legacy platforms.
Crucially, commercial quadcopters fostered a unique ecosystem of rapid prototyping that was impossible with factory-dependent legacy systems. The ability to utilize 3D printing, DIY electronics, and readily available mod kits allowed for swift adaptation and battlefield innovation without slow maintenance cycles. Furthermore, quadcopter hover capability enabled top-attack maneuvers, where explosive payloads were precisely dropped onto vulnerable targets. A notable example of this was the Ukrainian bomber drone dubbed Baba Yaga, capable of deploying anti-tank mines and even 155mm artillery shells. On both sides, the Chinese DJI Mavic 3 series became a preferred asset, valued for its high-quality hardware and affordability. It is important to note that during this phase of the war, quadcopters were still largely considered reusable assets.
The Rise of the One-Way Attack Drone and Expendability in Mid-to-Late 2022
As the conflict progressed into mid-to-late 2022, a pivotal shift occurred: expendability became a defining characteristic in drone design and deployment, leading to the widespread modification of both fixed-wing and quadcopter platforms into One-Way Attack (OWA) or "kamikaze" configurations. These drones fielded integrated warheads, designed for a single flight directly into their targets, detonating upon impact.
At this stage, OWA drones were primarily leveraged for long-range precision strikes and as loitering munitions, exploiting the principles of asymmetric warfare. A prominent example of a long-range OWA system was the Iranian-designed HESA Shahed 136, rebranded by Russia as the Geran-2. With an estimated operational range of up to 2,500 kilometers, these were employed to strike deep within Ukrainian territory, targeting critical infrastructure such as power plants and energy facilities, as well as air defense installations, radar sites, and command and control centers. Given their vulnerability to conventional air defenses, these long-range kamikaze drones were often deployed at night in large swarms, or as part of mixed strike packages involving other assets. Russia also utilized smaller, shorter-range fixed-wing drones like the ZALA Kub-BLA, designed to loiter over an area until a suitable target was identified and engaged.
Ukrainian forces, in turn, made extensive use of sophisticated U.S.-supplied systems like the AeroVironment Switchblade 300 and Switchblade 600, which functioned as loitering munitions against personnel and armored vehicles. Domestically developed platforms like the UkrJet were also employed for deep strikes into Russian territory. The cost of most of these OWA drones, typically ranging from $30,000 to $100,000, was far lower than that of traditional cruise missiles, making them a more cost-effective means of delivering precision strikes.
The emergence and widespread adoption of OWA or kamikaze drones were a direct consequence of strategically leveraging expendability to wage asymmetric warfare. Russia notably used OWA drones extensively to target civilian infrastructure, reportedly as part of a psychological warfare strategy, and integrated them into mixed attacks with Kalibr and Iskander cruise and ballistic missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. This phase laid a crucial foundation, demonstrating the profound impact of expendable, precise, and cost-effective aerial munitions.
The FPV Revolution in Mid-to-Late 2023
The period of mid-to-late 2023 witnessed another significant leap in drone warfare with the widespread and highly effective implementation of First-Person View (FPV) technology, predominantly integrated into quadcopters. This innovation armed drone pilots with the ability to execute strikes of extraordinary precision against both moving and stationary targets, fundamentally reshaping engagements. The advent of FPV drones led to the formation of specialized "hunter-killer" drone teams, often comprising a pilot, a target spotter/navigator, and support personnel, who could identify and neutralize asymmetric targets.
Utilizing small airframes often derived from racing drones, FPVs fielded impressive speeds exceeding 100 km/h, albeit with shorter flight times of single-digit minutes. This performance was optimized to evade small arms fire and deliver payloads with extreme accuracy. Videos of FPVs flying directly into the open hatches of armored vehicles showcased a level of precision previously unattainable with other drone types at this scale.
This stage of the conflict also marked significant progress in Ukraine's domestic drone manufacturing capabilities. Drone supply chains began shifting into Ukraine, fostering more complete and established local manufacturing processes, thereby reducing reliance on external commercial suppliers. Mass production efforts in volunteer-run workshops, utilizing tools like 3D printers, CNC routers, and imported kits, standardized highly adaptive engineering processes, allowing for rapid iteration and deployment of FPV platforms.
The flexibility and accuracy introduced by FPV technology have ensured its enduring relevance, with widespread use continuing well into the conflict. FPV systems have profoundly amplified the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare, increasing the vulnerability of larger, more valuable military assets like tanks. Consequently, the introduction and proliferation of FPV drones have had a skyrocketing effect on the military value of skilled drone pilots, who have now become crucial, high-value targets for both sides of the conflict.
Electronic Warfare and Russian Fiber Optic in Mid-2024
As the war progressed, the electronic warfare (EW) landscape in Ukraine underwent a dramatic transformation. What began as a domain dominated by high-end, centralized systems primarily wielded by state militaries evolved into a more democratized and decentralized struggle. Russia initially entered the conflict with a substantial EW arsenal, featuring systems like the Krasukha, Murmansk-BN, Leer-3, and Zhitel. These were capable of disrupting GPS, cellular, and radar communications. Reports indicated Russian EW was employed to jam or spoof incoming precision munitions, such as HIMARS-guided rockets and Ukrainian drones. In early 2022, Ukraine possessed fewer EW systems and initially concentrated its efforts on defensive measures against Russian jamming and protecting critical communication links.
As FPV and commercial drones proliferated, both sides began deploying smaller, more mobile EW units directly to the front lines to disrupt drone communications and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals like GPS. Russian Pole-21 systems and various Ukrainian countermeasures became increasingly common. In fiercely contested areas such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, the electromagnetic spectrum grew so dense with interference that drones would frequently lose connection and fall from the sky, or be forced onto autonomous routes.
This EW environment spurred a relentless cycle of innovation. Drone operators and engineers on both sides actively engaged in a constant battle for spectrum dominance, frequently switching control and video frequencies to find clear channels and evade enemy jamming efforts. This tactic of frequency hopping, alongside the use of analog controls for greater resilience, became a crucial element of FPV operations trying to bypass EW.
To counter jamming more robustly, Russia was the first to deploy FPV drones equipped with spools of fiber-optic cable. These tethered systems bypassed RF jamming entirely by maintaining a physical data link to the operator, shocking Ukrainian forces whose vehicles, fitted with last-ditch DIY jamming systems, had previously found some success in disabling FPVs during their final attack dive. Additionally, these tethered drones were also significantly harder to detect, as they avoid RF signal emissions that might otherwise alert infantry equipped with radio detectors to nearby drone activity.
A constant "Drones vs. EW vs. Counter-EW" cycle developed: as FPVs and loitering munitions proliferated, EW systems adapted to jam them. In response, drone operators shifted to pre-planned autonomous flight paths, frequency hopping, or physical tethers. This, in turn, prompted counter-EW efforts focused on locating and destroying the jammers themselves, turning EW operators into high-value targets.
Both sides employed tools like the Kvant-R or specialized SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) drones to hunt for enemy EW sources. Target-lock technologies, or last-mile/terminal guidance systems, began to be integrated into kamikaze drones, allowing drones to lock onto targets even if the radio link to the operator was severed.
EW has been a technical domain in the war in which Russia has had a clear advantage throughout. But the democratization of it -- similar to that of attritable frontline drones -- has enabled Ukraine to keep up. While it has recently incorporated its own version of fiber-optic spooling and other counter-EW adaptations, Russia has also maintained an edge due to better access to Chinese exports -- the main source of fiber-optic wires.
Enduring Trends and a Tactical Outlook
While the designs, operational tactics, and specific applications of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) on the Ukrainian battlefield are in a state of rapid, weekly evolution, certain fundamental tactical trends have demonstrated clear endurance throughout the conflict that continue to shape engagements.
An enduring trend is the integrated use of diverse drone capabilities in combined operations. Most frontline drone teams continue to employ a layered approach: higher-flying ISR drones are tasked with scouting for and identifying potential targets. These then call in strike drones equipped with FPV capabilities to engage them. This "hunter-killer" dynamic has proven highly effective, causing high-value assets such as tanks to face the threat of being swarmed if they venture too close to the frontlines. In fact, the threat of UAVs in the war has had the effect of pushing back the deployment of expensive assets behind frontlines. This defensive shift, in turn, has sustained the need for long-range, fixed-wing ISR drones capable of collecting such intelligence behind enemy lines. Naturally, highly-skilled drone pilots have become prime targets for opposing drone operations and artillery.
Although international attention has focused on the visceral, close-quarters combat involving FPV quadcopters, legacy drones remain very much in active use. Russia continues to launch thousands of Shahed/Geran OWA drones each month: expensive deep-strike drones are still employed by both sides in attempts to hit critical infrastructure and high-value targets located far beyond the frontlines. Russian military doctrine, in particular, has revolved around combined arms operations, where assets like glide bombs and missiles complement large-scale assaults and infiltrations into Ukrainian territory, with drones playing an integral role in ISR, artillery targeting, and direct attack within these operational frameworks.
The integration of AI into drone systems will undoubtedly further revolutionize their capabilities. Beyond current vision-based target-locking, AI could enable fully autonomous navigation in GPS-denied environments, dynamic threat assessment, and even coordinated swarming to overwhelm sophisticated air defenses, as currently developed by the Ukrainian start-up Swarmer. While EW has been a dominant factor in the drone-versus-counter-drone battle, a wider array of counter-UAS (C-UAS) measures have also been evolving. Specialized air defense systems and dedicated C-UAS interceptor drones are being developed. The challenge lies in developing these C-UAS capabilities to be as cost-effective and rapidly deployable as the drone threats they aim to neutralize.
Driving Factors and Characteristics
Drastic changes have taken place over very short timelines, with drone designers and manufacturers working tirelessly with the Ukrainian military to adapt their products. From legacy UAS to quadcopters, and through the emergence of OWA to dominant FPV integration, certain key technical and strategic variables have shaped the design and deployment of drones throughout the war.
-
Cost: The economics of drones have radically changed. Legacy platforms cost hundreds of thousands to tens of millions per unit, whereas quadcopters and FPVs dropped these costs closer to hundreds or low thousands per unit. This reshaped procurement, with units buying multiple FPVs for the cost of a single sophisticated loitering munition. This shift enabled mass production and attrition warfare, making risk-tolerant operations feasible and the loss of a drone tactically acceptable. Consequently, lower costs spurred a massive increase in deployment density, saturating the frontlines with UAVs.
-
Survivability: Large legacy drones were visible to radar, had predictable flight paths, and relied on GPS/SATCOM, making them vulnerable to EW and SAMs. FPVs and quadcopters offered smaller, faster, and lower-flying platforms, often below radar detection. Survivability was thus improved through signature minimization, EW avoidance, and sheer disposability. The enhanced penetration capability of these smaller drones in contested EW zones encouraged a tactical shift towards "kill-die-repeat" operations, where the loss of drones was part of mission cycles.
-
Deployability: Lengthy preparation times, meticulous flight planning, and extensive operator coordination caused legacy systems to take hours to deploy. FPV drones, however, can be launched within minutes by frontline troops, sometimes directly from trenches or mobile positions. Their maneuverability and speed enable near real-time response to threats or targets. This responsiveness allowed them to match the pace of mobile skirmishes and facilitate just-in-time strikes, effectively granting frontline units autonomous strike capability without waiting for higher-level air support.
-
Tactical Maneuverability: Legacy drones required long-range, high-altitude flight profiles, which were not suited for urban combat or dense trench networks. FPVs can dodge through windows, fly in alleys, or dive directly into vehicle hatches. Their responsiveness allows real-time pilot adaptation to conditions that enable surgical strikes at short range. This maneuverability transformed drones from recon tools into precision weapons.
-
EW Resilience: The heavy reliance on GPS and satellite communications of legacy drones could easily be jammed. Early quadcopters that used commercial video and control frequencies also proved vulnerable. In response, FPVs evolved with analog control, frequency hopping, autopilot modes, and fiber-optic tethers. This shifted the design focus toward EW avoidance and communications redundancy and fostered pre-planned GPS-free routes or fully analog guidance. Fundamentally, this created an ongoing EW arms race: drones adapt, jammers counter, and innovation follows.
Understanding factors that have consistently emerged as key parameters in the engineering design process of drones in Ukraine provides a clearer lens through which to comprehend the adaptive transitions between phases of this technological race. The effectiveness behind the Ukrainian battlefield's role as an innovative lab for drone development lies precisely in the nature of its iterative, real-world testing. With constant UAS operations throughout day and night, drone teams can immediately test modifications and new designs, whether for kamikaze FPVs or deep-strike platforms. The desperately efficient feedback loop between Ukrainian UAS designers, manufacturers, and soldiers has been fundamental to this rapid advancement, and put the traditionally slow acquisition process of Western militaries to shame.
Final Remarks
The rapid evolution of drone technology in Ukraine represents a remarkable wartime adaptation, extending beyond the battlefield into the commercial engineering sector. It showcases the extraordinary lengths to which the Ukrainian people have gone to innovate and resist the destructive and inhumane war waged by Putin.
However, this innovation is accompanied by profound ethical concerns, particularly regarding the increasing automation of conflict.
Videos show both Ukrainian and Russian soldiers desperately scrambling in their final moments on viral FPV footage, which is proudly shared online. Soldiers are increasingly further disconnected from the act of killing in troubling desensitization. Pilot training has been radically reshaped, moving from conventional ISR operations to mastering the high-speed, disorienting perspective of FPV racing drones. While physically removed from danger, FPV pilots are intimately involved in engagements, witnessing the direct impact of their actions. The result is cognitive load and ethical stress on these operators, alongside the psychological impact on soldiers persistently threatened from above.
Crucially, clear differences have emerged between both sides in the operation of drones. While Ukrainian forces train drone pilots in remote test sites, evidence strongly suggests the Russian military trains its pilots on civilian populations in cities like Kherson. Accounts describe shops, schools, clinics, delivery vans, buses, and even first responders as routinely targeted. Locals report Russian drones attacking civilians daily, chasing cars and pedestrians in what they call a "safari". Furthermore, deep-strike Shahed/Geran OWA drones frequently target residential buildings in targeted cities. Thus, while difficult, it is important to ensure the comprehensive study of drone warfare in Ukraine. It is not only a study of technological advancement but also a testament to the resilience of a desperate nation outnumbered on the battlefield, fighting an existential threat. The evolution of drone warfare continues to shape the battlefield and has become a symbol of the extraordinary adaptation of the Ukrainian people.
Sources:
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/loitering-munitions-in-ukraine-and-beyond/
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/01/18/russian-pilots-appear-to-be-hunting-ukrainian-civilians
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-attack-drones.html
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-fiber-optic-drones-russia/33344310.html
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2642-1.html
https://www.csis.org/events/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond
https://theaircurrent.com/ukraine-special-report/ukraine-drone-industry-part-1-plowshares-swords/